Among the al Qaeda franchise groups, such as al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and al Shabaab, tensions have erupted between members of the organization who favor the al Qaeda-like focus on the far enemy and those who want to focus their military efforts on the near enemy.
For the most part, the regional franchises are also under heavy pressure from the local authorities and are struggling to survive and continue their struggles. In such an environment, they have very little extra capacity to devote to transnational attacks. Even a local franchise group like al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, which has adopted more of a transnational ideology, can be constrained by such factors. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula has not been able to launch an attack directed against the U.
Moreover, it is important to recognize that al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula launched the attacks targeting the United States from its base of operations in Yemen rather than sending operatives to the United States to plan and execute attacks in a hostile environment. The group did not have operatives with the requisite tradecraft for such operations and also lacked the logistics network to support them.
Therefore, the al Qaeda franchise was limited to executing only the transnational attacks it could plan and launch from Yemen. So far, the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant has not demonstrated a focus on conducting transnational attacks against the far enemy.
It also has not shown that it has operatives capable of traveling to foreign countries to plan and conduct sophisticated terrorist operations there. However, the group retains a robust terrorist capability within its area of operation and has consistently been able to acquire weapons and explosives, fabricate viable explosive devices and recruit and indoctrinate suicide operatives. The Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant is far more than a terrorist organization.
It can launch complex insurgent campaigns and even conduct conventional military operations, govern areas of territory, administer social services and collect taxes.
Labeling the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant solely as a terrorist organization underestimates the group's capabilities, giving it the element of surprise when it launches a major military operation like the one resulting in the capture of a significant portion of Iraq's Sunni-dominated areas.
This account already exists, you can try logging on with this email. You may unsubscribe at anytime. Having trouble signing in? Contact Customer Service. Already a subscriber and need help getting access? Special limited time offer to qualified returning subscribers. Profile Notifications Sign Out. Terrorism and Insurgency First, it is important to recognize that terrorism is only one tool used by organizations that wage asymmetrical warfare against a superior foe. Constraints All that said, the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant is also constrained as it employs its military power.
Keep Reading: Create an account to get 3 free articles. Job Title. Recently viewed 0 Save Search. Terrorism, Civil War, and Insurgency. Jessica A.
Stanton Jessica A. The Oxford Handbook of Terrorism. Read More. Your current browser may not support copying via this button. Subscriber sign in You could not be signed in, please check and try again. Username Please enter your Username. In contrast, the common people are the targets of terrorist violence today, although this was not the case when terrorism first emerged in the modern era. When terrorism came to be first employed as a strategy in the late 19th century, the targets were symbols of political authority—kings, emperors, viceroys, political leaders, government officials, etc.
And these attacks were carried out only as the final resort and mainly against autocratic rulers and governments. When combined, these targets generally considered typical for guerrilla operations —such as military, government and police targets— are targeted in In sum, groups active in the Middle East and North Africa are more likely to attack civilian targets compared with their counterparts in the other geographic locations combined.
Still, attacks that could also be considered guerrilla attacks, ie, against military, police and government targets, outnumber attacks against civilian targets. The 10 most active groups labelled as terrorist groups by the GTD that operate in the Middle East and North Africa aim for non-civilian targets The concept of insurgency can help overcome the conceptual difficulties regarding the proper labelling of many contemporary militant groups because theorists of insurgency have long argued that insurgents typically rely on several modes of warfare at once.
Although theoretically these modes of warfare do not have to include acts of terrorism —insurgents can rely, for example, on a combination of conventional and guerrilla tactics— they almost always do. Viewing terrorist groups as insurgent groups should not be seen as an attempt to play down the fact that these groups frequently commit acts of indiscriminate violence. Yet it does help place these acts in a broader context of a more complex reality. Based on this understanding, even the most violent groups using the most despicable tactics are likely to spend most of their time and energy doing something other than killing civilians —fighting regular troops and government forces and subverting their enemies by means of propaganda and other political means—.
According to data assembled and analysed by Michael Findley and Joseph K. The conduct of civil wars is therefore, by definition, marked by insurgency and counterinsurgency, again suggesting a close interrelationship between terrorism and insurgencies.
In addition, the suggested label can be useful in explaining the adoption of both violent including terrorism and nonviolent means of political struggle, based on the present political, economic and social conditions on the ground.
Theoretically our conclusions also call for closer intellectual interaction between the terrorism and insurgency studies fields, as well as to the study of civil wars. Closer correspondence between these related fields can help shed more light on the political aspects of the campaigns in which terrorism occurs. Such policies should combine political and military components to address what is in essence a political-military threat. Finally, viewing terrorism as a phenomenon closely related to insurgency and civil war will allow analysts to pool the insights and best practices from academic fields that have thus far been treated separately.
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