Our results accord closely with the predictions of the rent-seeking model for men. Furthermore, we find that male hours worked and employment are reduced by 1. Interestingly, we do not find any effects among women.
We are unable to tell why there are such strong gender differences in the effects we estimate, though we suspect it is related to emerging evidence that boys are more sensitive to adverse shocks that occur when they are young than are girls.
Marianno and Strunk painstakingly code up these provisions for the bulk of California school districts for three iterations of negotiated CBAs. They then estimate how changes in the restrictiveness of union contracts relate to changes in student test scores.
While it is not totally clear why union contracts become more or less restrictive, they find that when these contracts are more restrictive student test scores go down or at least do not go up. A coherent story emerges from this body of evidence: Teacher collective bargaining leads to worse student outcomes that are reflected in long-run labor market success, and these deleterious effects are driven to some degree by the bargaining process.
From a policy perspective, these studies highlight the importance of developing a more complete understanding of what aspects of teacher collective bargaining are responsible for the worse learning outcomes. It might be possible to alter the scope of collective bargaining or the process itself to protect aspects that teachers value while reducing or eliminating the deleterious effects on students.
Those three states do have collective bargaining rights. However, Pennsylvania teachers have had both bargaining rights and the right to strike since , Paglayan said, which would account for the high number of strikes.
And while Illinois and California historically prohibited strikes and established monetary penalties against both striking teachers and the unions themselves, that has since changed, Paglayan said. Teacher strikes are now legal in both of those states. All Topics. About Us. Group Subscriptions. Recruitment Advertising. Events and Webinars. Leaders to Learn From. We combine the collective-bargaining information for teachers with — American Community Survey ACS data containing detailed information on the educational attainment and labor market success of representative samples of adults in each state.
We look specifically at ACS data for individuals between the ages of 35 and 49, because people in this age group typically have completed their education and are at a juncture when yearly earnings are indicative of lifetime earnings. We examine birth cohorts ranging from to , which correspond to students who attended school from to As shown in Figure 1, these schooling years correspond with the dramatic rise in duty-to-bargain laws in the United States.
Taken as a whole, our results clearly indicate that laws supporting collective bargaining for teachers have adverse long-term consequences for students. This represents a decline in earnings of 1. Although the individual effect is modest, it translates into a large overall loss of earnings for the nation as a whole. Hours worked. This is a 1. The reduced earnings caused by unionization could also reflect lower wages, and the evidence suggests a negative relationship between collective-bargaining exposure and wages.
While this relationship is not statistically significant, it is consistent with our other results and suggests that teacher collective bargaining may also have a modest adverse effect on average wages. The fact that teacher collective bargaining reduces working hours suggests that duty-to-bargain laws may also affect employment levels. In fact, when we use the share of individuals who are employed as the outcome variable, we find that duty-to-bargain laws reduce employment.
Specifically, exposure to a duty-to-bargain law for all 12 years of schooling lowers the likelihood that a worker is employed by 0. Duty-to-bargain laws have no impact on unemployment rates, however, suggesting that they reduce employment by leading some individuals to drop out of the labor force altogether. Occupational skill level. The results suggest yet another negative effect: being exposed to a duty-to-bargain law for all 12 years of schooling decreases the proportion of such workers in an occupation by almost half of a percentage point or 0.
This effect is modest in size, but it implies that teacher collective bargaining leads students to work in occupations requiring lower levels of skill. Educational attainment. The reduced earnings and labor force participation associated with teacher collective bargaining raise the possibility that affected students may have completed less education. Our analysis, however, finds little evidence of bargaining power having a significant effect on how much schooling students completed.
This finding is surprising in light of the substantial labor-market effects we document, but it comports with prior research that has found no effect of duty-to-bargain law passage on high-school dropout rates. Additionally, educational attainment is but one measure of the amount of human capital students accumulate.
Even if students do not complete fewer years of education, they may be acquiring fewer skills while they are in school. This study provides the first comprehensive analysis of the effect of teacher collective bargaining on the long-term educational and labor market outcomes of affected children. Include Synonyms Include Dead terms.
Peer reviewed Direct link. Today, more than 60 percent of teachers in the United States work under a union contract.
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